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Comments and Casenotes
Collateral Estoppel As Applied To Statements Made
By Attorneys At A Prior Trial Between
The 'Same Parties
By Joseph A. Matera
Stability and certainty are highly regarded values in
any legal system, and it is to these ends that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel1 is directed. The doctrine is, simply,
that parties to a cause of action which is partially if not
wholly based upon facts which were litigated in a previous
suit upon a different issue are bound by the determination
of such facts made at the prior trial, if such facts were
determinative of the issue in that trial. The purpose of
the doctrine is to bar repetitious litigation or the bringing
of piecemeal suits.2
The principle upon which it is based is certainly not a
new one.3 The Dutchess of Kingston's Case,4 decided in
1776, is said to be a source of the doctrine.' There the
court held that:
".. . the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, directly upon the point, is a plea, a bar, or is
evidence, conclusive between the same parties upon
the same matter, directly in question in another court."I
In an extensive discussion following the opinion in Smith's
Leading Cases, it is clearly stated "that a declaration or
admission will not give rise to an estoppel unless made
with full knowledge of the right alleged to be precluded."7
1 Although the rule is commonly known as collmteral estoppel, it has also
been referred to by the courts as estoppel by record (Alexander v. Walter
et al., 8 Gill. 239 (Md. 1849)) and estoppel by judgment; (Robertson v.
Robertson, 61 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1952); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40
(Fla. 1952) ).
IScott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942);
Note, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 52 Col. L. Rev. 647 (1952).
3The origins of the doctrine in Continental law are fully discussed in
Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata In Continental and
Anglo-American Law, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1940).
' The opinion in this case, reported as Doe v. Oliver, 20 How. St. Tr. 355,
538 (1776), can be found in 2 SMITH, LEADING CASES (6th ed. 1866) 648.
8 Millar, supra, n. 3, 5.
6 SMITH, Op. cit. supra, n. 4, 648.
Id., 753.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Before dealing more thoroughly with the doctrine, it
is necessary to distinguish it from the similar doctrine of
res judicata.8 At the outset it must be recognized that
there are two basic effects of a judgment: (1) that of de-
ciding the rights and liabilities of the parties,? and (2)
that of pronouncing a "sentence of law on the ultimate
facts admitted by the pleadings or proved by the find-
ings."10 It is to the first effect that the doctrine of res
judicata applies, barring a suit to relitigate a cause of ac-
tion already decided by a court. It is to the second, effect
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, rendering
a "sentence of law" conclusive as to those issues of ultimate
fact determined by the court; and no attempt may be made
to relitigate such issues by the same parties or their privies
in any subsequent action." Thus, it is apparent that res
judicata and collateral estoppel are both bars to relitiga-
tion, one in relation to the precise cause of action and the
other to the ultimate facts determined by the court as
adjudicated at the trial of that cause of action.
It is this similarity which causes the two rules to be
roughly grouped together, but to attempt any similarity
of application leads to grave error. Courts, therefore, are
forced to differentiate the two rules before determining
the proper scope of the collateral estoppel rule in a particu-
lar case.12
Both rules in effect contribute to certainty and sta-
bility, and both again suffer the weakness of perpetuating
falsehoods. But the rule of res judicata renders a possible
falsehood conclusive only with respect to a single claim or
cause of action. However, collateral estoppel could per-
petuate possible falsehoods conclusive as to all subsequent
suits between the same parties involving those issues of
ultimate fact determined by the court in the initial suit.'3
In view of this effect of the doctrine, the necessity of
applying it strictly becomes clear. Unless the parties can
with reasonable certainty determine what issues of fact
have been conclusively determined by the judgment, they
8 The use by courts of the term re judicata when referring to collateral
estoppel is a cause for confusion of the two rules. See, for example, White-
hurst v. Rogers, 38 Md. 503 (1873).
849 C.J.S. 26, Judgments, § 2.
"0 Ibid.
11 A leading Supreme Court case on the distinction between res judicata
and collateral estoppel is Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
12 Note, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment, 52 Col. L. Rev. 647, 648 (1952).
I8 Cases which make a point of citing the conclusiveness of rulings on
ultimate facts are: Tait v. Western Md. Ry. 0o., 289 U.S. 620 (1933), and
Southern Pacific Railroad v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
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will be forced to litigate not only the single claim put forth
in the pleadings, but all possible future claims which would
involve some of the same facts. Without such caution an
inadvertant admission could well lead to a future legal
defeat in an entirely different cause of action. There is
then a fine balance that must be preserved between
achieving stability and effecting justice in a particular
cause of action. It is the question of this balance that
frequently becomes the cause of controversy in regard
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The courts have adopted two general views with re-
lation to the scope and applicability of the doctrine. Most
courts have taken a conservative outlook, only applying
the doctrine where there has been actual litigation in
regard to a clearly ultimate fact, offered for proof. 4 On
the other hand, other courts have been more liberal, bar-
ring parties from litigating questions of fact which, for
example, were only collaterally proved, or admitted, or
inadvertantly indicated, by mere statements at a former
trial.'5
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, although not re-
ferring to the doctrine by name, has applied its principle
in line with the conservative view.'" In Cecil v. Cecil,
the Court sets out the general view that:
".. . to conclude any matter in issue between the
parties, it should appear by record or other proof, that
the matter was in issue and decided at the former
trial between the same parties."' 7
This ruling was further narrowed in Cooper v. Utterbach,s
where the Court of Appeal refused to apply the doctrine to
a finding by the jury on a question of fraud in the previous
trial. There the Court held that the rule should apply
only to facts directly in issue and "not to everything which
"The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. 2d 927, 928 (2nd Cir. 1944); Serpell-
Winner-Jordan v. Crete Mills, 51 F. 2d 1028 (8th Cir. 1931); Cooper v.
Utterbach, 37 Md. 282 (1873) ; King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9 (1844). RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 68, 293, supports this view, applying the rule
only "Where a question of fact essential to the judgment Is actually
litigated and determined, by a valid and final judgment . .. ."
15 Clinton Engines Corp. v. Briggs and Stratton Corp., 175 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. Mich. S.D. 1959) ; Wright v. Grlffey, 147 Ill. 496, 35 N.E. 732 (1893) ;
Adams v. State, 133 Okla. 194, 271 P. 946 (1928) ; Stradley v. Bath Portland
Cement Co., 228 Pa. 108, 77 A. 242 (1910).
1Whitehurst v. Rogers, 38 Md. 503 (1873) (collateral estoppel) ; Alex-
ander v. Walter et al., 8 Gill 239 (Md. 1849) (estoppel by record).
17 19 Md. 72, 79 (1862).
2837 Md. 282, 312 (1873).
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was incidently brought into controversy during the trial."
This case was cited with approval in the more recent case
of Barret v. Lohmuller Bldg. Co.,19 where the Court of
Appeals again refused to apply the doctrine, the issue in
question being a finding by the court of non-acceptance by
the plaintiff of work done for him by the defendant, a
collateral issue in the previous trial.
Thus, the conservative courts clearly require a showing
that the particular fact was (1) directly in issue at a
former trial between the same parties or their privies, and
(2) that the fact was ultimate in nature in that case.
This implies that the fact was the source of genuine argu-
ment between the adversaries before its adjudication.
The liberal courts, on the other hand, will treat facts,
the ultimate character of which is more doubtful, as
adjudicated facts and not subject to relitigation although
they have in no sense been the subject of heated debate
between the parties. Hence, facts merely consented to for
reasons of convenience,20 or admitted by counsel in the
course of legal maneuvering during the trial,21 have been
held to be subject to collateral estoppel.
It is this liberal approach that frequently raises the
question as to whether the aforementioned balance be-
tween stability and justice has been upset. The recent
case of Clinton Engines Corp. v. Briggs and Stratton Corp.22
is an example of this problem. That case involved an
alleged violation of anti-trust laws, pressed by Clinton
against Briggs and Stratton. In a prior suit between the
same parties but on an issue of patent infringement,
Clinton as defendant charged that Briggs and Stratton had
deliberately and fraudulently withheld from the patent
office its knowledge of previous public use of certain in-
ventions. Clinton's attorney, at the time of presenting a
motion to reopen proofs and for a new trial, was ques-
tioned by the court as to the reason for his failure to put
into testimony evidence concerning the former public use
of the patents involved. Apparently surprised by this
charge of lack of diligence, the attorney made this state-
- 151 Md. 133, 134 A. 37 (1926).
2Judgments by consent and default Judgments (see infra, ns. 31-33) are
areas in which certain facts may be consented to or left uncontested
because the smallness of the amount of money involved outweighs the in-
convenience of a trial on the issues. See Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150
(1878) ; Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E. 2d 673 (1952).
2Clinton Engines Corp. v. Briggs and Stratton Corp., 175 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. Mich. S.D. 1959).
0 Ibid.
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ment concerning the charge made against Briggs and
Stratton:
"If that charge is made I don't stand upon it ... and I
am sure we would agree to withdraw it. I have known
Mr. Jones and right here I want to say that is not
correct or encouraged.
'28
In the second suit the court would not allow Clinton,
as part of their attempt to show Briggs' scheme to create
a monopoly, to revive the charge made against Briggs
and Stratton in the previous suit. The court held that the
statement made by the attorney brought about the equiva-
lent of an adjudication on that particular issue, and there-
fore Clinton was collaterally estopped from relying on
any charge of misconduct by Briggs and Stratton in the use
of the patents in question. The court concluded that the
concession by Clinton amounted to a determination
against the factual existence of such claimed misconduct.
Thus, what may have seemed like an unimportant state-
ment to the attorney at the time became a litigated issue
under the court's liberal application of this doctrine of
collateral estoppel, and not subject to a "re-duer in a
future suit.24
The problem as to when this doctrine will be applied
to bar statements made by attorneys in a prior suit be-
tween the same parties is one which would no doubt arise
in only the more liberally inclined courts. Two prdblems
are apparent in such an application of the doctrine: (1)
When does a statement made by an attorney become an
issue of ultimate fact? (2) May such a statement which has
not constituted a contested issue of fact between the parties
be treated by the court as an adjudication upon the fact
it contains?
As mentioned above, collateral estoppel applies not to
every issue which is raised in a trial, but only to those
issues involving ultimate facts as distinguished from evi-
dentiary facts. In the leading case of The Evergreens v.
Nunan,25 Judge Learned Hand defined an ultimate fact
as "one of those facts upon whose combined occurrence
the law raises the duty, or the right, in question." An
evidentiary fact was described in the same case as one
from which the existence of an ultimate fact could be
- Id., 403.
24Id., 404.
141 F. 2d 927, 928 (2nd Cir. 1944). Flor discussion of "ultimate facts"
in relation to findings required of administrative agencies, see 2 DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958) § 16.06.
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rationally inferred.2" In another leading case in this area,
King v. Chase," an ultimate fact was described as one vital
to the determination of the case, so much so that the cause
of action would not have been decided in the same way
on other grounds, and as a fact which receives as careful
a consideration as if it had been the main and only ques-
tion in the controversy.28
It does not seem fair to say that the statement made by
the attorney for Clinton was a statement of an ultimate
fact. It was not even made on the attorney's own initiative
but came in response to a question of the court implying lack
of diligence by him in the discovery of evidence. To avoid
this dilemma he chose to deny a charge made in his plead-
ings at the original hearing. 29 It was in no sense a con-
tested issue, but the court interpreted this concession as
vital enough to constitute an ultimate fact which has
been decided for all time as to any future suit between
these same two parties.
Assuming that a fact is ultimate in nature, the ques-
tion then arises as to whether the mere concession of such
a fact can be treated as an adjudication thereof. There is
a split of authority upon this question. The liberal argument
is that, although the second suit is on a different cause of ac-
tion, each party has had his day in court as to the issues
which he constructively admitted by not contesting them,
or which he chose to concede as part of the trial tactics
in his first encounter. There the fault is considered to be
his own and the inference is that the lawyer was either
negligent in conceding such fact or had insufficient evi-
dence to rebut it, if it was asserted by his opponent."0
Courts following this line of reasoning have had no diffi-
culty applying collateral estoppel to a judgment by consent,8'
2The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. 2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1944). IN RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS (1948 Supp.) 337, the writers of the RESTATEMENT adopt
this analysis by Judge Hand as a "clear and workable definition of the
two classes of facts." They refer to ultimate facts, however, as "facts in
issue."
S15 N.H. 9 (1844).
I Ibid.
Supra, n. 21.
0 Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 157 U.S. 683 (1895) ; Bissell v.
Spring Valley Township, 124 U.S. 225 (1888).
31 Stradley v. Bath Portland Cement Co., 228 Pa. 108, 77 A. 242, 243
(1910). There the court said:
"It has always been the law that a judgment by consent or by default
raises an estoppel just in the same way as a judgment after the court
has exercised a judicial discretion in the matter."
Whether it has always been the law or not, the much earlier case of
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1876), recognized the harsh-
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or a judgment by default,32 situations in which the
danger of a liberal application of the doctrine are most
apparent. The Clinton case, however, expands the doctrine
to its extreme limits, for here the issue of fact in question
was not one that was constructively admitted by Clinton's
attorney by failing to contest the fact. Nor can it be said,
without some reservation, that an ultimate fact as such
was conceded by the attorney to the court. The language
used was not so strong as to absolve Briggs and Stratton
of any wrongdoing. In what seemed more like a hedging
maneuver, the attorney answered the court's query re-
garding Clinton's charge in their original pleadings by
saying such charge was "not correct or encouraged.
33
This is not the unequivocal language which would seem to
be called for in characterizing a fact as one so vital to the
judgment that when conceded it would amount to an ad-
judication upon that fact. Nor do the circumstances indi-
cate that the "careful consideration" standard, alluded to
in King v. Chase,4 was influential in the court's decision
on this issue of fact.
The point of the matter is that statements which do
not go to the very heart of an issue in controversy, which
do not become a basis of contest between the opposing
ness in so applying collateral estoppel. Considerations of the party allow-
ing such a judgment to be rendered against him, such as smallness of
amount of value, involved expense of litigation, inconvenience, etc., should
not render him estopped in future claims arising out of the same
transaction.
In Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150 (1878), cited in Note, Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment, 52 Col. L. Rev. 647, 654 (1952), the harshness of
such an application of collateral estoppel was most apparent. In this case,
a prior default judgment in favor of a doctor for a small sum owing for
services rendered to a patient operated to bar a malpractice suit by this
same patient for a significantly larger sum. The reasoning the court used
in applying collateral estoppel was that the default judgment conclusively
determined that the physician's services were of value since the patient
had allowed such a judgment to be rendered. It follows from this determi-
nation that the services could not have been harmful. In RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS (1942) § 68 d, 300-301, it was felt to be most unjust to a defen-
dant "to hold that his failure to defend should have the same result as
though he had interposed a defense and it was found that the matters
alleged in the defense were untrue."
IsKelleher v. Dozzi, 7 N.J. 17, 80 A. 2d 196 (1951) ; Lumberton Coach
Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 ;S.E. 2d 673 (1952). Judge Hand in The
Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. 2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1944), points to some of the
same weak points in so applying the doctrine as we saw in the case of
default judgments. The same considerations which influenced a party to
allow a default judgment are also applicable to a consent judgment. Thus
It does not logically follow that a party defendant to a consent judgment
conclusively admits liability. Despite this, such consent could become the
basis for an estoppel in a future suit between the same parties on a
different claim. The obvious result is to discourage voluntary settlements
in the original suit.8 3Supra, ns. 21-23.
Supra, n. 27.
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attorneys, and which are in effect part of the legal maneu-
vering of the attorney charged with them, would not
appear to qualify as valid subjects for application of the
collateral estoppel rule. The inherent weakness and dan-
gers of the rule would certainly be most likely realized in
this area of application. Objective standards in asserting
the rule would give way to wide discretion on the part of
courts as to when a statement made by an attorney has
taken on the dignity of an ultimate fact, conceded to the
extent of denying the possibility that it could ever be a
source of litigation between the same parties again.
Another effect of such a liberal approach to collateral
estoppel would be the burdening of parties with a stand
upon certain issues which they had not discussed thor-
oughly with their attorney because of the seeming ir-
relevance or unimportance of such facts at that time.
They would thus be committed to a position they had no
hand in creating. It is highly conceivable, for example,
that Clinton had no intention of making the concession that
its attorney found expedient to make at the time. This
situation has no doubt occurred in numerous suits though
it would not appear on the record.
While it seems clear that the majority of courts at
least give lip service to the ultimate fact test in applying
collateral estoppel, it may be necessary to re-examine the
concept of what constitutes an ultimate fact, a practice that
would prevent too liberal an extention of the doctrine."'
More exact word measurements than are frequently ap-
plied by the courts would be a step in this direction."
Another means of guarding against the dangers inherent
in the very nature of the doctrine would be to apply it only
Judge Learned Hand in The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. 2d 927, 929
(2nd Cir. 1944), points out that even when the doctrine is correctly applied
to ultimate facts, the result often is unfair. Thus, his proposal, in event
that the law were to be recast, would be to limit the conclusiveness of a
judgment, even as to ultimate facts, to future controversies that "could be
thought reasonably in prospect when the first suit was tried."
However, it would seem that the difficulty of determining what was
reasonably in prospect may be fraught with even greater problems than of
determining what is ultimate fact, which would seem to be the basic
problem.
Among the inexact phrases courts have used in referring to ultimate
fact are: "[f]acts cardinal to the decision," Venetsanos v. Pappas, 21 Del.
Ch. 177, 184 A. 489, 490 (1936) ; facts "technically in issue," Winnipiseogee
Lake C. & W. Mfg. Co. v. City of Laconia, 74 N.H. 83, 65 A. 378, 379 (1906) ;
no "estoppel as to unessential facts, even though put in issue by the
pleadings," Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P. 2d 670, 675 (1935); no
estoppel unless fact is material, Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 146 N.E. 321,
324 (1924), MacKenzie v. Union Guardian Trust Go., 262 Mich. 563, 247
N.W. 914, 921 (1937); estoppel applied to facts "essential to the finding
of the former verdict." Whitehurst v. Rogers, 38 Md. 50, 517 (1873).
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to matters which have been clearly contested by the par-
ties. Such an approach will better assure the litigants that
the issue has been conclusively determined by the court
and that it has been decided correctly. To this end, the
less liberal courts will apply the doctrine only to those
issues of fact which in the prior proceeding were
vigorously litigated by the parties and determined by the
court, and which clearly involved ultimate facts found
in favor of the victor. The end result of such an approach
is to create less hesitancy on the part of attorneys other-
wise fearful that chance statements be characterized as
ultimate facts, thereafter binding in suits between the
same litigants. Moreover, any issue of fact which is made
the subject of argument by the attorneys will then more
likely be one of an ultimate character.
Following the more conservative approach, it would
seem improbable that mere statements, not clearly con-
tested and not vital to the determination of rights and
liabilities of parties in a particular suit, would become
subject to estoppel in all future suits between the same
parties as to facts contained therein. Viewing the general
scope of cases this approach appears to be that of a ma-
jority of the courts. The degree of stability sacrificed by
this line of thought regarding collateral estoppel seems
minimal. The effect of insuring more justice to the parties
concerned and greater freedom to the attorney in the
argument of his case far outweighs this sacrifice.
[VOL. XXI
